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John Stuart Mill's support for, and predictions of, cooperative production have been 
taken as a coherent wedding of liberal and socialist concerns, and as drawing together 
later nineteenth-century political economy and working-class radicalism. Despite its 
evident significance, the alliance of political economy and cooperative production was, 
however, highly conflicted, contested, and short-lived, in ways that help to shed light on 
the construction of knowledge of society in nineteenth-century Britain. Mill's vision 
should be seen as developed in contrast to the sociological and historical perspectives of 
Auguste Comte and Thomas Carlyle, as an attempt to hold together political economy as 
a valid form of knowledge with the hope of a new social stage in which commerce would 
be imbued with public spirit. This ideal thus involved debate about competing social 
futures and the tools of prediction, as well as entering debates within political economy 
where it was equally embattled. Even Mill's own economic logic tended more towards 
support of profit-sharing than cooperative production, and hopes for the latter became 
significantly less persuasive with the introduction of the concept of the entrepreneur into 
mainstream British economics during the 1870s and 1880s. 
 
 
I 
John Stuart Mill's Principles of political economy with some of their applications to social philosophy, 
published in seven editions between 1848 and 1871, was the dominant text in economic 
thought at the high point of Victorian liberalism. There was one chapter of this work that 
Mill thought had 'a greater influence on opinion than all the rest': chapter seven of book 
four, or 'On the probable futurity of the labouring classes'.1 This was the chapter in 
which Mill outlined his support for, and predictions of, the end of wage labour and its 
replacement by profit-sharing and cooperative production. On the publication of the 
Principles the chapter helped to win over the allegiance of working-class cooperators and 
Christian Socialists to Mill's restatement of Ricardian economics.2 The chapter became an 
important reference point for Mill's allies among political economists, including John 
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Elliott Cairnes, Henry Fawcett, and William Thomas Thornton, as well as a young Alfred 
Marshall.3 The significance of the chapter was still evident in 1892 when the economist 
Langford Lovell Price informed readers of the Economic Journal that wage labour was 
generally viewed as a temporary phenomenon and that the 'plain, average man' if asked 
about the future of the economy, would respond with the words of the 'Probable 
futurity' that predicted a transition through associations of labourers with capitalists, to 
associations of labourers among themselves.4 The potential force of this belief is shown 
by Beatrice Webb's recollection of Odgers, secretary of the Cooperative Insurance 
Company in 1889, who had been inspired by the 'Probable futurity' to give up a salary of 
two hundred pounds a year in order to become a cooperative employee earning one 
pound a week.5  
The chapter has understandably been cited as an important aspect of Mill's 
establishing of a 'two-way relationship between 'official' and popular economic culture', 
helping to make cooperators Liberals and to make liberals sympathetic to cooperation, so 
that 'during the second half of the century no ideological barrier had been left between 
Liberalism and co-operativism'.6 This interpretation of Victorian liberalism can be seen to 
fit neatly with prevalent interpretations of Mill's cooperation.7 Whilst this literature is 
large and varied, it has displayed a strong recent tendency to stress Mill's theoretical 
coherence in the marrying of his liberal ideals of individual independence with his 
concern to alter distribution, and specifically to end capitalist control of businesses. 8 
Showing the way in which Mill's liberal values could lead directly to his cooperative 
commitments lends an evident credence to the possibility of a broader merging of 
orthodox political economy and the hopes of certain working-class radicals. 
If Mill's predictions of cooperative production had a kind of moral coherence, 
and an undeniably broad impact, they were also, however, a difficult marriage of social 
science and political economy, and ultimately a failure. They were a failure not only in the 
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sense that wage labour persisted, but also in the more important sense that the 
mainstream of economic thought quite clearly came by the 1890s to regard the possibility 
of worker ownership and control of businesses as implausible, a conclusion that can be 
seen as incipient already in earlier opposition to Mill's views and in his own vacillations as 
to the practicability of abolishing the capitalist in the 1860s.  The alliance of a critique of 
capitalist profit and control with political economy depended on a mid-Victorian 
ambiguity surrounding the theorization of business leadership: the conflation of ideas of 
organizational skill and authority with investment in the language of the 'capitalist', later 
fatally eroded by the arrival of the 'entrepreneur'.  
Understanding these facts aright helps to temper ideas of the closeness of the 
relationship between liberalism and cooperation, and shows a sense in which 'official' 
economic culture never fully accommodated working-class radicalism. It also sheds light 
on the thinking of Mill, helping to show the conceptual fragility of predicting a new form 
of sociability that would go beyond mere exchange emerging from the workings of a 
competitive market with their ultimate requirements of efficiency. Discussion of Mill's 
ideals on a range of issues of economic reform has now been highly developed.9 What 
has not been captured, however, is the broader story of Mill's failure to fully integrate 
cooperation into political economy, which has potential implications for how one 
understands the balance of his normative aims and their possible tensions. More 
generally, Mill's liberal vision of a classless society was thus an important episode in the 
history of the relationship between political and social thought and the authority of 
economics. Its failure when situated in a broad context becomes in one sense a failure of 
liberalism to reconcile economic analysis with the ideal of fully extinguishing hierarchies 
of status within civil society. 
 
II 
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That Mill's primary moral aims were not necessarily tied to the abolition of the capitalist, 
and that his argumentative contexts were torn between economic and more historical 
forms of knowledge, is aided by first acknowledging that in an important and neglected 
sense Mill's predictions of cooperation emerged from his negotiation with the ideas of 
his interlocutors Thomas Carlyle and Auguste Comte. This negotiation was to help to 
shape a long pattern of nineteenth-century argument. It was natural for Mill to think of 
these figures as a pair. Mill recalled his first encounters with the ideas of Comte, the 
Saint-Simonians, and Carlyle in the late 1820s and early 1830s together in his 
Autobiography; they had helped to cement Mill's sense of living through a period of 
transition on the way to a new permanent moral epoch in which creeds would no longer 
'require to be periodically thrown off'.10 Mill was thereafter inclined to view the period 
from the Catholic Relief Act of 1829 to the electoral reforms of 1832 (the period also of 
the July Revolution of 1830 in France) as having inculcated among the populace at large 
the same profound sense of living in a world of change, in a way that brought the 
possibility of resolving class conflict to the fore.11 The common ground between Mill, the 
Saint-Simonians, Comte, and Carlyle was not simply a general sense of orientation to the 
future.12 It also involved a shared desire to see a resolution to class conflict and an end to 
the corrosive effects of commerce on public morality. 
This common context was still pressing for Mill in the early 1840s, when he was 
in correspondence with Comte, and Carlyle had entered a new phase of his career as a 
social critic with his pamphlet on Chartism.13 Late in 1842, after finishing the last volume 
of Comte's Cours de philosophie positive, Mill wrote to Comte of the 'great and luminous new 
idea' Comte had outlined, that 'high social qualities' were to be discovered in 'the world 
of business and industry, notwithstanding the essentially egotistical motives that today 
rule almost exclusively.' He was reminded of recent conversations with Carlyle, who had 
insisted that it would be possible to find a 'poetic idealization' of industry, given that 
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military life had been similarly lauded despite the inherent repulsiveness of its violence. 
Comte had convinced Mill that the sociability found in armies was due to the function 
that they performed, providing intellectual and moral discipline to groups of men 
associating for a common end. A 'true organization of industry' would serve the same 
purpose, and Mill wrote that he was now able to abandon the fears he had experienced as 
to the decline of sociability in an 'epoch of transition' and a 'modern kind of industrial 
civilization'.14 These were fears Mill had most eloquently expressed in his essay 
'Civilization' in 1836.15 Mill had extracted Comte's tonic, strikingly, from a strident 
statement of the need to abolish the distinction between private and public functions.16 
Mill never lost his appreciation for this military metaphor for industrial sociability, and it 
was reiterated in Auguste Comte and positivism in 1865.17 Carlyle's similar reflections 
germinated in early 1843 in Past and present's emphases on noble and competent 'Captains 
of Industry' and the replacement of 'Arms and the Man'  by 'Tools and the Man' as a new 
epic theme.18 Whilst for both Carlyle and Comte such language represented a level of 
commitment to social hierarchy Mill did not share, its basic common purpose was to 
stress the possibility of subordinating economic life to public interests, to the 'interest in 
the common good' Mill would come to see cooperative societies as representing.19 The 
uneasy shared usage of this imagery of public service was to continue to play out, with 
Carlyle's sense reiterated by Ruskin alongside his virulent opposition to Mill's economics 
from the 1860s onwards.20 
Mill's 'Probable futurity' was in one sense a kindred text with Comte's own 
predictions and Carlyle's Past and present, all three concerned to forecast the way in which 
economic life was tending towards a reformation that would provide a new kind of social 
cohesion buttressing social and political order. Yet the idea of giving the private realm of 
commerce a new public spirit operated very differently for Mill than for either Comte or 
Carlyle. Comte shared with the Saint-Simonians a historical sense based on the imminent 
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end of a critical period and the emergence of a new organic unity, which would involve a 
spiritual power of scientists directing and morally overseeing a temporal power based on 
existing economic hierarchies and devoted to peaceful material advancement, or 
industrialism, that would end the disastrous militarism of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic wars.21 This was a contribution to understanding how to close the periodic 
constitutional crises set in train by the French Revolution.22 Yet despite Saint-Simon 
having shared a sense of the importance of industry with more obviously liberal figures 
such as Jean-Baptiste Say, both he and Comte became increasingly hostile to using 
political economy as a foundation for a scientific understanding of society.23 For Comte 
political economy after Adam Smith relied too much on a thin logic devoid of 
observation, and in its conclusions helped to buttress the social atomism of the 
eighteenth century that logically tended to deny the significance of government.24 
Political economy was ultimately a threat to a united science of society and politics.25 The 
'organization of industry' and the end of private commercial interests was for Comte to 
be understood as part of a moral and intellectual shift of epochs, outlined by a sociology 
that required no science of the workings of civil society separate from forms of 
administration. Despite evident differences, there were also strong parallels here with the 
ideas of Carlyle. Beyond Carlyle's sense of the rising importance of industry and its 
replacement of militarism, he too saw the French Revolution as the culmination of a 
negative period of atomism and hollowed-out authority, with political economy's 
worship of wealth and doctrine of laissez-faire part of the general crisis. Likewise, he 
tended to collapse distinctions between society and government, regarding the instating 
of right authority as a question of a general historical transition in morality and ideas, 
operating across economic life and politics. Mill was keen, by contrast, to preserve the 
authority of political economy. This went hand in hand with seeing virtue as hinging on 
an active character that could be fostered by competition, and regarding the 'organization 
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of industry' as the incorporation of commerce into an associational world that was 
oriented to the public good, but which would still counterbalance the state.26 
Mill's journey towards the 'Probable futurity' was thus also one of differentiating 
his conception of the future economy from both Carlyle and Comte, and the two texts 
that were the clearest precursors of the 'Probable futurity' were directed against them. 
The first was a review of Arthur Helps' Claims of labour in 1845. Mill had been perturbed 
by tendencies to discuss questions of poverty and class conflict with decreasing reference 
to the lessons of political economy. In the wake of Chartist disturbances, and increasing 
interest in working-class life drawing on the reports of various Royal Commissions, Mill 
saw a fashionable movement towards an ill-informed philanthropy. The statements of 
the Young England group around Disraeli, the social thinking of the Tractarians, and the 
impact of the writings of Carlyle, who Helps overtly admired, were all helping to speed 
the current.27 Mill saw a need to recall the public's attention to the lessons of Malthus, 
that a true solution to poverty required the fostering of responsibility for family size. 
More fundamentally, Mill argued that any attempt to benevolently raise the condition of 
workers without concern for their own self-regulation would lead to control of all aspects 
of their lives. Such a proposition was not only undesirable but impractical given the 
progress of the 'spirit of equality and the love of individual independence'.28 This was a 
direct precursor of the first section of the 'Probable futurity' which sought to show the 
way that theorists of 'dependence', advocating a benevolent hierarchy to solve social 
problems, were out of joint with the times.29 
Mill's concerns over British public debate and policy on poverty continued 
throughout the 1840s, and during the course of the Irish famine between 1846 and 1847, 
as he was composing the Principles, he was driven to distraction by what he saw as the 
lack of sufficiently serious long-term thinking about how to solve the situation.30 In May 
of 1847, six months after Comte had last written to Mill requesting a further arrangement 
 8 
of the financial support Mill had helped with previously, Mill wrote his final response. It 
was a kind of ironic commentary on Comte's ideas, describing the famine as a period of 
crisis aggravated by philanthropic intentions, which would lead through 'total chaos' and 
a 'more or less anarchic way of life' towards the need for a 'reconstruction of society', 
parodying the way that Comte had united political economy and the selfishness it stood 
for with the atomistic crisis of the eighteenth century that would lead towards a new 
Positivist order. Mill's crowning statement was that to treat workers as 'cattle', asking 
them to work for 'good food and housing' was only possible 'when the whip was added', 
and that thus 'In industry as elsewhere, we cannot make the old system work while 
stripping it, one by one, of its means of action.'31 The closeness of this sentiment to those 
of the 'Probable futurity' helps to confirm that Comte stood amongst those Mill sought 
to criticize.32 For Mill the visions of both Comte and Carlyle were plausibly reducible to 
the addition of benevolent authority to existing hierarchical structures. Though both 
Carlyle and Comte were capable of an appreciation of Malthus, in Mill's eyes they did not 
safeguard the motivational power of competition, needed not only to avert Malthusisan 
catastrophe but also the enervation of active character.33 
Seen in this light there is a difficulty with reading the 'Probable futurity' at face 
value as an attack on those who wanted to return to some imagined past or defend the 
social status quo.34 Mill was also engaging in a quite different form of debate, based on 
competing predictions and their sanction from historical interpretation.35 This was made 
explicit by Mill in 1865. Comte's predictions left ‘positive thinkers on the one hand, 
leaders of industry on the other, the future necessarily belongs to these: spiritual power 
to the former, temporal to the latter. As a specimen of historical forecast this is very 
deficient; for are there not the masses as well as the leaders of industry? and is not theirs 
also a growing power?’36 Comte had not extrapolated from existing tendencies at work 
through the whole of history in the manner of Tocqueville, who for Mill had 
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convincingly discussed the inevitable coming of social equality based on an 
understanding of the whole course of civilization.37 Tocqueville did, however, stand as 
backing for Mill's own method in the 'Probable futurity', which built a narrative out of 
the Reformation, the rise of political agitation, the circulation of newspapers, and 
growing worker mobility, to suggest that demands for equality of status were 
irreversible.38 In mobilizing Tocqueville as the model for a linear view of the course of 
history to counteract the cyclical return of socially appropriate forms of authority, Mill 
was making a defensive move. The writings of Comte and Carlyle implied that Mill's 
social liberalism and political economy were archaic relics of the eighteenth century. Mill 
was not putting an inherently progressive point of view, but having to argue about what 
progress consisted of, and to do so through negotiation over method in social science, 
and the nature of the moral and mental developments that it revealed. The immediate 
importance of the social ideals of the Oxford Movement, Young England, and also 
Carlyle were to noticeably wane from the late 1840s onwards as their publications slowed 
and the 'Condition-of-England question' came to appear less politically and economically 
pressing. Yet both Carlyle and Comte as well as Mill contributed markedly to a growing 
Victorian sense of economic life as moving towards a more socially cohesive future 
rather than representing a completely fixed order, and the idea of moralized economic 
leadership was to continue to compete with Mill's vision of a coming era of equal status. 
 
III 
At one level Mill's narrative of workers' growing desires for independence lent support to 
the idea of the end of hiring and service, as workers would seek to throw off the shackles 
of wage labour.39 This desire would become even more pronounced as the approach of 
the stationary state and the slowing of economic growth weakened workers' individual 
prospects of advance to self-employment.40 Yet this line of thinking remained primarily a 
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negative argument refuting alternative futures. It held no force as a prediction of new 
forms of economic organization, which instead required an account of the competitive 
disadvantages of wage labour. Thus whilst the 'Probable futurity' was engaged in 
questions of historical development, its predictive authority involved reasoning about 
wages, profits, and the nature of the firm that lay squarely within the relatively temporally 
static conceptual world of political economy, and this represented a very different 
argumentative context, and a weak point of Millian backing for cooperative production. 
Mill saw the competitiveness of different types of economic organization as 
determined largely by the motivation that they induced in their members. Giving hired 
employees a share of profits increased their motivation and productivity and made firms 
more competitive. This principle worked in favour of both profit-sharing and 
cooperative production. Yet there was a countervailing influence in the motivation that 
an individual owner gained from his much greater pecuniary interest in the overall 
success and failure of a business, which maximized his zeal in management. On this 
account, profit-sharing had one advantage that cooperative production did not. Joint-
stock companies, by contrast, potentially suffered from both being run by a hired 
manager, and also not having a highly motivated workforce, helping to explain why their 
future dominance was unforeseen.41 It was on this basis that from 1845 to 1852 Mill saw 
profit-sharing as the future and remained agnostic about cooperative production's 
success. Profit-sharing would serve to make 'the employers the real chiefs of the people, 
leading and guiding them in a work in which they also are interested—a work of co-
operation, not of mere hiring and service; and justifying, by the superior capacity in 
which they contribute to the work, the higher remuneration which they receive for their 
share of it.'42 By contrast, Mill in 1845 saw worker control as good both if it succeeded, 
and if (as implied) it failed, for it could 'prove to the operatives that the profits of the 
employer are but the necessary price paid for the superiority of management produced 
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by the stimulus of individual interest; and that if the capitalist be the costliest part of the 
machinery of production, he more than repays his cost.'43 In 1848 and 1849 Mill argued 
against cooperative production's plausibility, associating all necessary leadership with the 
capitalist, equating those whose work was most necessary and who deserved a greater 
interest in the success of the concern with those who provided funds and needed 
incentives to do so, through higher rewards and a greater voice.44 Mill's 1850 evidence to 
the Select Committee on the Savings of the Middle and Working Classes shows that 
whilst he saw it as possible that profits were inflated by the wealthy having an 
uncompetitive monopoly on the capital needed to set up in business, he was genuinely 
uncertain about the economic viability of cooperative production.45 Mill desired, like 
Carlyle, that ‘the rule that they who do not work shall not eat, will be applied not to 
paupers only, but impartially to all’.46 Yet just as Carlyle had been clear that the leaders of 
industry were a species of workers, Mill too saw it as at least possible that the capitalist 
was engaged in irreplaceable labour as well as the provision of funds for the carrying on 
of large enterprises.47 
By 1852 Mill's outlook had changed and profit-sharing had become a mere way-
station before cooperative production.48 Given Mill's moral support for cooperative 
production in 1845 this must be seen far less as a normative shift than the resolution of 
what was for Mill a factual question, allowing a more ambitious statement of how far the 
movement towards partnership would travel.49 The expansion meant that Mill could now 
effectively describe the natural evolution of private property under economic 
competition as resulting in the collective ownership of the means of production. The 
novel part of Mill's argument was that the capitalist's particular contribution could be 
seen to be dispensable because some workers had shown in practice the capacities of 
saving and collective management to make it so. Mill believed that he had garnered such 
evidence by 1852 from Henri Feugueray's accounts of non-state-owned French 
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cooperative workshops. It is plain from the construction of the 'Probable futurity', which 
ballooned with examples of successful businesses and even statements of their accounts 
over the course of its variants, that although cooperative production meshed with 
workers' independence, Mill would not have launched into predictions of the success of a 
mode of economic organization without having any evidence of such success. As he put 
it, 'If only a few operatives had attempted this arduous task, or if, while many attempted 
it, a few only had succeeded, their success might have been deemed to furnish no 
argument for their system as a permanent mode of industrial organization.'50 This 
statement would come to seem less watertight over the next forty years as a large number 
of cooperative experiments in Britain did in fact fail to gain permanent footholds. As 
with all of Mill's reasoning here and on socialism in general, the ultimate question was 
one of trial and observation. The observation having been made, however, to Mill's mind 
the absence of cooperation's proliferation could be seen as a mark of the moral failings 
of workers.51 As Mill wrote in 1864, 'as long as there are any working people who are 
dishonest—as long as there are any who are idle, who are intemperate, who are 
spendthrifts—so long there will be working people who are only fit to be receivers of 
wages.'52 Mill's predictions thus helped to create an atmosphere among advanced liberals 
in which it was unclear whether to theorize the economic difficulty of cooperative 
production, or whether to simply engage in further moral exhortation. 
In 1865 Mill's chapter showed signs of reversion. The crucial sentence outlining 
the chapter's predictions now ceased to refer to profit-sharing as temporary, and made 
cooperative production's ultimate success less certain.53 This change was accompanied by 
a statement that profit-sharing schemes might be desirable for ‘a considerable length of 
time’, since they preserved unity of authority for effective decision-making, and ‘the 
competition of capable persons who in the event of failure are to have all the loss and in 
the case of success the greater part of the gain’.54 The problem of how to move from 
 13 
profit-sharing to cooperative production thus re-emerged and was still present at the end 
of Mill's life as he wrote the Chapters on Socialism, and hymned profit-sharing's successes 
whilst seeing its supersession by worker ownership as dependent on employers 
voluntarily bequeathing businesses to their employees.55 These changes have in some 
recent accounts been ignored as authors traced Mill's steady one-way journey towards 
cooperative and socialist commitments.56 What they reveal is significant however, as 
Mill's commitment to cooperative production began to cleave away from his 
commitment to the competitive workings of the market which would safeguard active 
character. Mill's joining of the cultural authority of political economy to the idea of 
replacing private individual ownership of collective endeavours began to fracture. These 
changes also show Mill as affected by his surroundings, in ways that remind us that 
Millian political economy was a body of knowledge with rules not determined in a simple 
sense by Mill's moral values. 
One reason for the changes is that much of what mattered to Mill about 
cooperation was just as easily achievable with profit-sharing. The aims of making workers 
in some sense partners, of making them exert themselves for a common goal, and above 
all of achieving proportionate reward, so that workers and the capitalist would be paid at 
the rate appropriate to their contributions to the enterprise, were all potentially achieved 
by profit-sharing. It served sufficiently to create an associational industrial virtue. Too 
much has been made of Mill's statement that cooperation would embody the 'best 
aspirations of the democratic spirit'.57 This did not indicate simply a desire to extend 
democracy to economic institutions, but was (as the next clause indicates) a reference to 
ending the distinction of the 'industrious and the idle'.58 Idleness (and selfishness) were 
embodied in workers who would rather work for the equal reward of wages than stake 
their remuneration on the success of a collective undertaking.59 The capitalist, however, 
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might very well be industrious, and this was precisely what Mill's uncertainty over 
cooperative production indicated. 
Another important reason for the change was that profit-sharing was now in 
fact being carried out. The 1860s saw a new general enthusiasm for profit-sharing, 
consisting of several schemes and a great deal of publicity, and resulting in the spread of 
the language of 'industrial partnership'. The most famous of these was that of the 
Yorkshire coal-mining firm of Henry Briggs, Son, and Company, proposed in 1864. The 
Briggs family contacted George Jacob Holyoake, who engaged in a publicity exercise on 
their behalf, sending the prospectus to Mill, Fawcett, and Louis Blanc.60 Mill wrote back 
that the Briggs family had 'done themselves great honour in being the originators in 
England of one of the two modes of Co-operation which are probably destined to divide 
the field of employment between them.'61 When Mill reasserted his doubts about the 
success of cooperative production, he was in part reflecting the fact that his original 
vision of profit-sharing now appeared to be coming to fruition, and had captured the 
attention of the country at large. 
This general enthusiasm was accompanied by changes to the law. As Mill had 
pointed out, the law that all who shared in profits be treated as partners with unlimited 
liability made incredibly difficult a scheme like that of the Parisian house-painting firm 
Maison Leclaire that had been publicized by the ex-Saint-Simonian Charles Duveyrier 
and thence through Mill's own writings.62 By the 1852 edition of the Principles which had 
privileged cooperative production, Mill had been aware that the recent Industrial and 
Provident Societies Act had given new legal protection to producers' cooperatives whilst 
leaving difficulties with profit-sharing untouched.63 Such difficulties were removed by an 
Act to Amend the Law of Partnership in 1865, which nevertheless made it clear that 
profit-sharing did not render the 'servant or agent' a partner, or give them the rights of a 
partner.64 This is worth noting not least because it made it clear that profit-sharing was 
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not in legal terms what Mill's rhetoric had suggested that it could be: an end to hiring and 
service and a new form of partnership.65 
Mill was also moving in tandem with sympathetic figures within political 
economy. In May of 1863 Henry Fawcett had proposed the question ‘To what extent is 
the principle of Co-operative Trade Societies among the Working Classes economically 
sound?’ at the Political Economy Club. Mill wrote to Fawcett after having missed the 
debate, making clear that cooperation depended on workers' morality, but also conceding 
that certain industries might be more difficult to collectively manage.66 Fawcett had made 
clear on a similar basis that cooperative production was not as certain of success as 
consumer cooperatives in his own extremely successful Manual of political economy, 
effectively a condensed version of Mill's Principles.67 William Thomas Thornton, who was 
likewise enamoured of cooperation's potential and convinced it had a bright future, had 
also written in 1864 of the advantages of unity of control, only outweighed by 
cooperation's sole advantage of worker incentivization, thus seeing a significant 
permanent role for profit-sharing.68 Mill, Fawcett, Thornton, and Cairnes shared a sense 
of a cooperative principle whose highest form was cooperative production. Yet the 
framework within which the economic rationale for cooperation had been couched 
logically led to the conclusion that profit-sharing firms would undersell those owned by 
workers. Economic concerns with the sources of firms' efficiency did not directly 
support Mill's historical account of the emergence of a society of equal and autonomous 
partners.  
 
IV 
These considerations matter in part because much of what the 'Probable futurity' 
effected in changing the tone of discussion of labour relations was due to the authority of 
political economy. The campaigner for cooperative production George Jacob Holyoake 
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made this clear when he expressed his gratitude that 'it was Mr. John Stuart Mill who, as 
an authority in political economy, extended to co-operation scientific recognition'.69 Mill's 
text had a similar importance for the Christian Socialists and their own ideals of worker 
self-governance. When Charles Kingsley cited the predictive force of the 'Probable 
futurity' as part of a pairing with the moral lessons of the Bible in his novel Alton Locke, it 
was a mark of the way that he acknowledged the worth of political economy whilst 
seeking also to keep its claims within proper bounds.70 Frederick Denison Maurice 
invoked Mill as an economist to support the Christian Socialist agenda.71 John Malcolm 
Ludlow too employed the chapters on property from the second edition of the Principles 
by the ‘great living master of political economy’ to trump the criticisms of the essayist 
William Rathbone Greg and show the potential viability of socialist ideas.72 It was simply 
the culmination of this tendency when another of the group, Frederick Furnivall, asked 
Mill's permission to republish the 'Probable futurity' as a pamphlet for workers.73 
Mill's economic authority also directly helped to cause profit-sharing and 
cooperative production to garner more serious discussion that it otherwise would have 
done from those who saw political economy as the primary means of discussing social 
issues. Yet his perspective clearly failed to carry all before it. Greg shared a sense of Mill's 
authority with his Christian Socialist opponents.74 He was a scion of a successful 
Lancashire mill-owning family of a classically paternalist bent, whose brother Samuel had 
been lauded in the 1840s for his experimental model employment practices but who had 
also left the family distraught by the end of the decade by almost bankrupting his branch 
of the firm.75 William wrote for the Edinburgh Review in the late 1840s and early 1850s to 
combat what he saw as the philanthropic economic illiteracy of both the Christian 
Socialists and Thornton Hunt's Leader, not least on a Malthusian basis Mill obviously 
shared.76 Greg was not interested in institutional change, however, so much as a more 
systematic and better-informed benevolence that would accept wage labour as part of a 
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world divinely ordained to make the virtuous happy.77 He was sceptical as to even profit-
sharing succeeding, given that wages could be seen as simply a regular and secure form 
of granting workers their share in profits without exposing them to losses.78 This was not 
an effective argument against simply adding a bonus to wages, but did show an 
important concern with the stability of workers' pay that cooperative production would 
clearly jeopardize. On worker control, Greg in turn saw elected managers as likely to lack 
zeal, and the 'power to enforce subordination', and doubted that cooperators could 
appreciate their true interests or obtain such knowledge from a manager more cheaply 
than they already did.79 Greg's real hopes unmistakably lay in economic growth and 
individual advancement. 
The same lines of argument were taken up by John Ramsay McCulloch, who 
asserted that in the vast majority of cases giving workers a share in profits was 
impossible, since it would involve workers both sharing in losses, with high risk of 
penury, and having a partner's interest in control, limiting the effective authority of 
employers.80 John Lalor, whose work was primarily an attempt to reassert against Mill the 
Christian political economy of cyclical commercial convulsions put forward by Thomas 
Chalmers, nevertheless shared with Mill a sense of profit-sharing and both consumer and 
producer cooperatives as important phenomena.81 Yet he also cited with approval one of 
the articles in which Greg had expressed scepticism over cooperative production, and 
was clear himself of the difficulties of workers understanding the preciousness of that 
'industrial discipline which capital now enforces'.82 Charles Morrison's Essay on the relations 
between labour and capital involved an attempt to negotiate between the expert authority of 
Mill on the one hand, and Greg and McCulloch on the other.83 The latter won out, with 
Morrison seeing prospects for profit-sharing as highly limited, and cooperative 
production as facing nigh-on insuperable difficulties, although Morrison could agree (as 
had Lalor and Greg) with Mill's earlier sentiments that failure on any of these fronts 
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would teach workers a lesson in the value of capitalist management and hence social 
cohesion.84 
If by the 1860s Mill had more support from other economic thinkers, his 
predictions were also opened up to a new front of disagreement from the arguments of 
the British Positivists, most notably Edward Beesly and Frederic Harrison. The broader 
context for this fault-line was evidently the difference between Millian liberalism and the 
ideals of Comte, yet its imminent force came from heightened discussion of trade unions, 
representing a new challenge to a vision of workplace harmony. This shift was signalled 
by the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science’s report on Trades’ 
societies and strikes in 1860. The report emphasized that strikes were capable of raising 
wages, and presented unions as established institutions which were necessary in order to 
create a genuine parity between buyers and sellers of labour. The idea that unions helped 
to achieve a fair market price helped to end a crude version of the wages fund doctrine, 
overturning the harsh anti-union line taken by figures like Nassau Senior and Harriet 
Martineau.85 Yet if the report united a new wave of opinion including Positivists, 
Christian Socialists, and Millian political economy in condemnation of rigid ideas of wage 
determination, it could not create unity as to the future. The report did not entirely 
condone trade union activity, yet there was no single obvious alternative.86 The majority 
report mentioned the beneficial effects of worker investment in joint-stock companies, 
and the minority report the formation of national councils of capitalists and workmen.87  
In this context, Henry Fawcett effectively rewrote the 'Probable futurity', 
incorporating trade unions into its framework. In his 1860 article on strikes which 
represents his most important contribution to political economy, Fawcett argued that it 
would be possible for workers to temporarily raise wages by means of a strike during a 
period of extraordinary profits, and before the ordinary rate of profit had had time to 
assert itself by attracting more competitors to an industry. In these circumstances it 
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would also be rational for employers to capitulate, and the negotiation so effected was 
for Fawcett effectively the creation of a profit-sharing scheme. Unions could be seen as a 
rational form of association appearing once feudalism and philanthropy had been thrown 
off, demonstrating the rise of independence. They could also be shown to lead towards 
cooperative production. ‘Intelligence induces combinations, combination tends to create 
a partnership between employers and employed, and this will lead to those higher forms 
of co-operation which will alike realize all that has been sought either by the economist 
or the philanthropist.’88 Fawcett sought to make the NAPSS conclusions safe for political 
economy and liberal class harmony by stressing that unions could achieve no more than 
profit-sharing, and were its logical precursors. On this basis Mill could incorporate 
Fawcett's recognition of bargaining over the price of labour into the Principles.89 It also 
made easier Mill's abandonment of the wages fund doctrine that saw wages as 
determined by a set proportion of capital divided amongst labourers, since Mill shared 
with Thornton, who pressed this issue to conclusion, a sense of unions paving the way 
for profit-sharing and cooperatives.90 
This opening up of such issues also afforded an opportunity for Positivism, 
however. Over the course of the 1860s Frederic Harrison and Edward Beesly 
campaigned to afford trade unions greater legal recognition, and in the process also 
sought to make clear that this was not part of the rise of workers' independence, but 
rather a movement towards the instating of correct moral leadership in industry. 
Following Mill's Auguste Comte and positivism, in 1866 Harrison hit back at the cooperative 
ideal, describing the cooperative movement in terms that made it seem either irrelevant 
to the question of the employment relationship, motivated by selfishness, or in fact 
Positivism in disguise. Not only was cooperation's success limited to retail, but 
cooperators themselves were divided between one party motivated 'to keep themselves 
with their own money' and another who wanted a system in which 'capital freely devotes 
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part of its profit to labour'.91 Harrison denied the plausibility of Mill's moral vision of 
intertwined economic competence and virtuous independence, in mutually supportive 
growth towards a new sociability of equals. Harrison had a deep admiration for Carlyle, 
who he saw as in many ways teaching the same lessons as Comte.92 The association can 
be seen in Harrison's assertion that 'The head of a great production is like the captain of 
a ship or the general of an army. He must have scientific knowledge, technical 
knowledge, practical knowledge, presence of mind, dash, courage, zeal, and the habit of 
command.' Such a head required the total freedom also afforded by ownership, for 'You 
cannot buy the inspiring authority any more than the electric will of a great military or 
political chief. It is impossible to hire commercial genius and the instincts of a skilful 
trader.’ For Harrison 'The main and the just complaint of labour' was the 'oppressive use' 
of the power of the capitalist. Thus, a ‘great, free, and wise capitalist’ should ‘by advice, 
help, example, and experience, promote the welfare of those about him’, acting ‘almost 
as a providence on earth’, a possibility presaged by the spirit in which ‘some of the largest 
estates’ and ‘some very large manufactories’ were already carried on. The lauding of 
existing business enterprises as models of moralization veered closer to Carlyle than to 
Comte’s positive polity, and the tone was reinforced with a reference to the need to limit 
‘The Gospel according to Mammon’.93  
The same basic points were made by Edward Beesly in his lecture on the ‘Social 
future of the working classes’ delivered to an audience of trade unionists in May 1868, 
with trade unionism marking an attempt to gain security and a moralized workplace in 
which power would be exercised more in accordance with popular consent, and above all 
for stability of remuneration. Industrial organization required the same 'great power and 
great responsibility' as military organization. The point threw into stark relief the 
impracticability of cooperative production: ‘Special skill and training, unity of purpose, 
promptitude, and, occasionally, even secrecy, are necessary for a successful direction of 
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industry just as much as of war.’94 Beesly came close to self-contradiction in claiming 
both that cooperation required a disinterestedness only possible through organized 
religion, and also appealed to 'sharp, shifty men’ interested in a business success that was 
little to do with morality. 95 This was, however, a continuation of the attempt to claim 
that what was good in cooperation was a plea for the moral regeneration of hierarchy in 
industry, and that the rest of its ideals were a backward selfishness. 
The Positivist vision was not laughed off by the workers and union leaders such 
as Robert Applegarth and George Odger to whom it was addressed.96 Beesly's attack on 
cooperation was also capable of appreciation by those who did not sympathize with 
ultimate Positivist aims.97 The strength of the Positivist attack, coupled with their 
influence as legal campaigners, can be seen in the need felt by both Thornton and 
Cairnes to respond with defenses of Mill's ideals. In On labour Thornton attacked 
Harrison's interpretation of unionism's meaning, and ridiculed his marriage of 'Captains 
of Industry’ to a defense of unionism: ‘‘Captains of Industry,’ quotha. Yes, verily, every 
unionist private may perhaps be well enough content that there should be officers in the 
army of labour; only with this important proviso, that he himself should hold one of the 
commissions.’98 Cairnes presented cooperative production in his Leading principles of 1874 
as a direct refutation of the Positivists.99 This went hand in hand with his clashes over 
method in social science with Harrison in the mid-1870s, in which he also criticized 
Comte's law of three stages, and cast doubt on any existing capacity to predict specific 
events rather than to cautiously extrapolate tendencies that might be counter-acted.100 
Beesly and Harrison's implacable opposition to the moral ideals of cooperative 
production dealt it a significant blow. They contributed to shifting the terms of debate 
from a language of independence versus dependence within which Mill had operated, to 
a more recognisably twentieth-century language of individualism versus collectivism 
within which Mill's particular vision of decentred public virtue was harder both to place 
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and to appreciate. Equally, they helped to keep to the fore questions of talent and 
leadership that challenged cooperation's plausibility. 
 
V 
Such criticisms were to gain in force. In his 1888 History of political economy the Positivist 
John Kells Ingram took the opportunity to point out one of the ways in which the work 
of John Stuart Mill and John Elliott Cairnes had been superseded. Their neglect of the 
'function of the entrepreneur' had reduced this vital figure to little more than the owner 
of capital, a trend partially corrected by Walter Bagehot, Francis Amasa Walker, and 
Alfred Marshall. For Ingram thinking about business leadership had been partly 
intentionally retarded: 'It can scarcely be doubted that a foregone conclusion in favour of 
the system of (so-called) cooperation has sometimes led economists to keep these 
important considerations in the background.'101 Despite evident bias, Ingram was right 
that Mill's vision of cooperative production and its union of capital and labour was in 
many ways lent the death-blow within economics by the formalization of ideas regarding 
the primacy of scarce talent for business success, codified in the concept of the 
entrepreneur. 
Marshall's presence in Ingram's list is most revealing, since he had maintained 
strong hopes for cooperative production. In 1873, in a paper presented to the Cambridge 
Reform Club, Marshall had made clear that in an ideal economy with highly educated 
workers, ‘in many industries production would be mainly carried on, as Mr and Mrs Mill 
have prophesied, by “the association of labourers among themselves on terms of 
equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and 
working under managers elected and removable by themselves.”’102 In the early 1920s, 
Marshall added a note to the manuscript of ‘The future of the working classes’, stating 
that ‘it bears the marks of the over-sanguine temperament of youth.’103 
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Marshall's changing opinions were in part influenced by the work of others. He 
saw the difficulties of cooperators recognizing the value of management well-outlined in 
an 1874 article by Thomas Brassey, son of the famous profit-sharing railway contractor 
of the same name..104 Here, as in Brassey's Work and wages of 1872, cooperative 
production was supported, but Brassey also drew on experience to discuss the important 
market value of leadership which made cooperative production so hard, particularly in 
complex enterprises.105 Harrison had in fact used Brassey's evidence of business 
leadership's importance to look forward to when 'co-operation, and every other bastard 
form of socialism, will be forgotten as the clumsy efforts of a generation which had failed 
to understand even the problem that was set for it to solve’.106 Marshall’s Economics of 
industry of 1879 cited Brassey’s Lectures on the labour question, at the point at which Marshall 
outlined a difference between the decision-making or 'engineering' of a business, and its 
more routine 'superintendence', making clear that cooperation would be harder where 
engineering was more significant.107 Marshall likewise discussed Walter Bagehot whilst 
outlining the concept of 'business power' as a requisite for production, which had its own 
market value separate from that of either capital or skilled labour, and crucially involved a 
set of relatively non-specialized organizational skills learnt through practice.108 Walker’s 
Wages question was also used by Marshall to argue that ‘It is no longer true that a man 
becomes an employer because he is a capitalist. Men command capital because they have 
the qualifications to profitably employ labour. To these captains of industry or organizers 
of industry capital and labour alike resort for the opportunity to perform their several 
functions.’109 
These points served to undermine the Millian conception of the 'wages of 
superintendence' as the element of profit the capitalist earned from exertion rather than 
investment, and thus to distinguish routine labour from entrepreneurship. Walker in 
particular saw the cooperation of Mill and Cairnes as entirely misconceived thanks to its 
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lack of appreciation for the primacy of leadership to profitability, an argument supported 
with the writings of Harrison.110 Marshall still differed significantly from Walker, who 
despite having provided the 'most graphic' depiction of the entrepreneur, regarded 
business talent too much as a natural resource and not enough as created by training and 
education.111 Such education clearly left Marshall some opening for cooperation, but the 
theorization of business leadership as a distinct occupation with specific skills was not 
easily reconciled with worker self-government. Presiding at the Cooperative Congress at 
Ipswich in 1889, Marshall stressed that cooperative production was not labour hiring 
capital, but the harder proposition of workers' business ability attracting capital. His 
speech was effectively a plea for the consumer Cooperative Wholesale to continue to 
support cooperative production from without, despite the latter's familiar litany of 
failures.112 
When Marshall's Principles of economics appeared in 1890, it had the entrepreneur 
at its core. For Marshall the modern economic world was one with the 'growth of 
business UNDERTAKERS’ and manufacturing simply increased the scope for ‘the 
natural selection of the fittest to undertake, to organize, and to manage’. It was no longer 
the case as in early and mid-nineteenth century accounts that employment was due to the 
need for capitalists to provide (increasingly large and costly) tools to workers; rather it 
was the division between generalized business ability and labour that represented 'the 
chief fact in the form of modern civilization, the kernel of the modern economic 
problem.'113 In this 1890 edition Marshall still put a brave face on cooperative 
production’s possible future success, writing that its difficulties would be reduced 
through experience and education, although also by the federation of cooperatives (again 
indicating the need for stores to subsidize workshops). A series of changes between the 
first and second edition, however, indicate Marshall hardening in a view that cooperative 
production could not compete successfully in a world where scarce business ability so 
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strongly determined efficiency.114 These changes were possibly due to disillusionment 
with the Cooperative Wholesale drifting away from cooperative production, particularly 
under the influence of Benjamin Jones, who spoke after Marshall at Ipswich in 1889, and 
who influenced Beatrice Potter to regard the consumer movement as a complement to 
state socialism.115 They were also a tipping point in a much longer argument about the 
plausible social future. 
 
VI 
To return to our starting point, when L. L. Price, a friend of Marshall's, wrote of the 
'Probable futurity' in 1892, he came not to praise cooperative production but to bury it. 
Price was reviewing Beatrice Potter's History of co-operation which of course had the same 
intention, though Price was not straightforwardly allying with Potter's partisan but since 
rather influential account of cooperative production and profit-sharing as an 
individualistic, profit-driven deviation from the views of Robert Owen. Nevertheless 
Price regarded Mill's cooperation as founded on confusions surrounding managerial 
remuneration and wages, as well as profit and interest, dating back to Adam Smith. In 
addition cooperation was morally questionable given the desirability of stable incomes 
for workers. Mill's chapter also had only a ‘specious appearance of being “in conformity 
with nature”’ in its linear predictions, for ‘she rather allows scope for many different 
experiments in many different directions', a statement that reminds us that despite Mill's 
frequently experimental rhetoric, in this instance his force had come from more direct 
prediction.116  
The support of economic thought for cooperative production had been 
conflicted, and embattled, and was now to a large extent over. It had emerged not only 
from Mill's normative concerns, but from an attempt to wed a social scientific account of 
the rise of workers' independence with the authority of political economy. This marriage 
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was in turn made plausible by the nature of the era's economic thought, in which the 
capitalist subsumed concepts of both investment and management, with capital provision 
tending to overshadow talent as a means of understanding employment hierarchies. 
Compounding this was an absorption of questions of talent within a discourse of general 
education and improvement of character (rather than occupational training), which 
resulted in a certain moralizing vagueness about how cooperation might be achieved. By 
the 1890s, while there were still various possibilities for lessening wage disputes, most 
notably through arbitration, there was now no longer any sense for liberal economists 
that the employment relationship itself represented a soluble problem, although at times 
it clearly remained a problem. Under Marshall, there was now a fairly clear divide 
between questions of economic analysis and the success of types of firm, and those of 
the potentialities of a new stage of social development. Moreover, images of the rare 
competencies of the entrepreneur in organizing others were to make it hard to rediscover 
Mill's vision of the market itself as a buttress for a universally independent civic 
personality. 
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